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Abstract
The use of software agents for automatic contract negotiation in e-commerce and e-trading en-
vironments has been the subject of considerable recent interest. A widely studied abstract model
considers the setting in which a set of agents have some collection of resources shared out between
them and attempt to construct a mutually beneficial optimal reallocation of these by trading re-
sources. The simplest such trades are those in which a single agent transfers exactly one resource
to another—so-called ‘one-resource-at-a-time’ or ‘O-contracts’. In this research note we consider
the computational complexity of a number of natural decision problems in this setting.
 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Mechanisms for automatically negotiating the allocation of resources in a group of
agents form an important body of work within the multiagent systems field. Typical ab-
stract models derive from game-theoretic perspectives in economics and among the issues
that have been addressed are strategies that agents may use to negotiate, e.g., [9,12,14], and
protocols for negotiation in agent societies, e.g., [2,10].
In this paper, we investigate the computational complexity of one of the most fundamen-
tal questions that may be asked of such a negotiation setting: that of whether a particular
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The particular negotiation setting we consider—introduced by Sandholm [13]—relates to
the reallocation of resources amongst agents. The idea is that, starting from some initial
allocation, agents can negotiate to transfer resources between themselves to their mutual
benefit. At each stage of negotiation, agents make deals by transferring resources to other
agents, and receiving resources in return. The feasibility question in this setting may be
informally understood as follows.
Given some initial allocation P s of resources to agents, and some potential final alloca-
tion P t , is there a sequence of deals that will be individual rational to all involved, such
that at the end of this sequence of deals, the allocation P t will be realised?
It could be argued that a positive answer to this question does not imply that negotiation
will be successful, as it merely implies the existence of an individual rational sequence of
deals to get from P s to P t . The agents in question may have their own (perhaps irrational)
reasons for rejecting some deals in this sequence. Moreover, unless the feasibility checking
process is constructive, the agents may not be able to find the desired sequence of deals.
A negative answer, however, surely rules out any chance of getting from P s to P t : for
every possible sequence of deals realising this reallocation, some agent would suffer in the
course of its implementation, and would therefore reject it.
Our main result is to show that this problem—and a number of natural variations of
it—is NP-hard. We also investigate the complexity of a number of related problems: for
example, we show that the problem of determining whether a particular allocation is Pareto
Optimal is co-NP-complete.
2. Preliminary definitions
The scenario that we are concerned with is encapsulated in the following definition.
Definition 1. A resource allocation setting is defined by a triple 〈A,R,U〉 where
A= {A1,A2, . . . ,An}; R= {r1, r2, . . . , rm}
are, respectively, a set of (at least two) agents and a collection of (non-shareable) resources.
A utility function, u, is a mapping from subsets ofR to rational values. Each agent Ai ∈A
has associated with it a particular utility function ui , so that U is 〈u1, u2, . . . , un〉. An
allocation P of R to A is a partition 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pn〉 of R. The utility function, ui , is
monotone if ui(S)  ui(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . The value ui(Pi) is called the utility of the
resources assigned to Ai .
Starting from some initial allocation—P0—individual agents negotiate in an attempt to
improve the utility of their holding. A number of interpretations have been proposed in
order to define what constitutes a ‘sensible’ transfer of resource from both an individual
agent’s viewpoint and from the perspective of the overall allocation. Thus in negotiating a
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outcomes for the agent Ai :
– ui(Pi) < ui(Qi) Ai values the allocation Qi as superior to Pi ;
– ui(Pi) = ui(Qi) Ai is indifferent between Pi and Qi ; and
– ui(Pi) > ui(Qi) Ai is worse off after the exchange.
In a setting in which agents are self-interested, in order for an agent to accept an exchange
with the last outcome, the notion of a pay-off function is used: in order to accept the new
allocation, Ai receives some payment sufficient to compensate for the resulting loss in
utility. Of course, such compensation must be made by other agents in the system who in
providing it do not wish to pay in excess of any gain in resource. In defining notions of
‘pay-off’, the interpretation is that in any transaction each agent Ai makes a payment, πi : if
πi < 0 then Ai is given −πi in return for accepting a contract; if πi > 0 then Ai contributes
πi to the amount to be distributed among those agents whose pay-off is negative. Formally,
such a notion of ‘sensible transfer’ is captured by the concept of individual rationality.
Definition 2. Let 〈A,R,U〉 be a resource allocation setting. A deal is a pair 〈P,Q〉 where
P = 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉 and Q = 〈Q1, . . . ,Qn〉 are distinct partitions ofR. We use δ to denote an
arbitrary deal. The effect of implementing the deal 〈P,Q〉 is that the allocation of resources
specified by P is replaced with that specified by Q.
A deal 〈P,Q〉 is said to be individually rational (IR) if there is a pay-off vector π =
〈π1,π2, . . . , πn〉 satisfying,
(a)
∑n
i=1 πi = 0.
(b) ui(Qi)− ui(Pi) > πi , for each agent Ai , except that πi is allowed to be 0 if Pi = Qi ,
i.e., should the deal (P,Q) leave the agent Ai with no change in its resource then it is
not required that Ai be rewarded (have πi < 0).
Definition 2 captures one view of a deal being ‘sensible’ with respect to the perspec-
tive of single agents. We require also concepts of ‘global’ optimality. We consider two
commonly used versions of this: Pareto Optimality and (Utilitarian) Social Welfare.
Definition 3. Let P be an allocation ofR amongA. The utilitarian social welfare resulting
from P , denoted σu(P ), is given by
∑n
i=1 ui(Pi).
The allocation P is Pareto optimal if for all allocations Q differing from P , it holds(
n∨
i=1
[
ui(Qi) > ui(Pi)
])⇒
(
n∨
i=1
[
ui(Qi) < ui(Pi)
])
. (1)
Thus a Pareto optimal allocation is one in which no agent can attain better than its
current utility except at the cost of leaving some agent worse off.
We make frequent use of the following result throughout the remainder of the paper.
Fact 4 [7]. A deal 〈P,Q〉 is IR if and only if σu(Q) > σu(P ).
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imise social welfare or be Pareto optimal, thus the agents involved seek to find a sequence
of deals that will terminate in an optimal allocation. Given the setting it is clearly the case
that there are allocations Popt and Qopt with the properties that σu(Popt) maximises social
welfare and for which Qopt is Pareto optimal—of course, Popt and Qopt may not be unique.
If the object is to maximise social welfare then clearly the deal 〈P0,Popt〉 will achieve this
in a single round. It is unreasonable, however, to view such a deal as a viable solution:
although always IR (if it represents a strict increase of social welfare) it is questionable
whether it could be identified as the first and only deal required. The total number of pos-
sible allocations is nm, and so for moderately large numbers of resources (m) there are
too many feasibly to enumerate (even when n = 2). In addition, it may not be possible to
implement the optimising contract in a single transaction even if only two agents are in-
volved: the environment in which the trading process is implemented may not be suited to
handling transactions in which large numbers of resources are involved; similarly, the pro-
tocol used for negotiation and contract description may not allow arbitrarily large numbers
of resources to be dealt with.
In order to develop a realistic framework for negotiation, Sandholm [13] (using Smith’s
Contract-Net model [16]), presents a number of classes of contract type. In this article we
are concerned with the following of these.
Definition 5 [13]. Let δ = 〈P,Q〉 be a deal involving an allocation ofR amongA. We say
that δ is a cluster contract (C-contract) if there are distinct agents Ai and Aj for which,
(C1) Pk = Qk if and only if k /∈ {i, j}.
(C2) There is a unique (non-empty) set S for which Qi = Pi ∪ S and Qj = Pj \ S (with
S ⊆ Pj ) or Qj = Pj ∪ S and Qi = Pi \ S (with S ⊆ Pi ).
Thus a C-contract involves one agent transferring a subset of its allocation to another agent
(without receiving any subset of resources in return).
The definition of C-contract permits an arbitrarily large number of resources to be trans-
ferred from one agent to another in a single deal. For the class of contracts of interest in
our subsequent results, we wish to impose a bound on the maximum number of resources
that can be moved in one deal. We thus introduce the notion of C(k)-contracts.
Definition 6. For a resource allocation setting 〈A,R,U〉 and value k  m = |R|, we say
that δ is a k-bounded cluster contract, (C(k)-contract) if δ is a C-contract in which S—the
set of resources transferred—contains at most k elements. When k = 1, we use the term
one contract (O-contract): the name given to such deals in [13].
We recall that a C(k)-contract 〈P,Q〉 will be IR if and only if σu(Q) > σu(P ).
A sequence of deals ∆ = 〈δ1, δ2, . . . , δt 〉 for which δi = 〈Qi−1,Qi〉 is called a contract
path realising the deal 〈Q0,Qt 〉. The length of a contract path is the total number of deals
comprising it. Given a predicate Φ over deals, we say that a contract path ∆ is a Φ-path if
Φ(δi) is true of every deal δi within ∆.
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if δ is an individually rational C(k)-contract. In the case of k = 1, i.e., IR O-contracts, such
paths are attractive from an implementation viewpoint since these only involve agent-to-
agent negotiation concerning a single resource at a time. In addition, starting from a given
allocation, the number of O-contracts that are consistent with it is exactly m(n − 1), as
opposed to nm possible allocations. Thus heuristic methods may be able to find improved
allocations by exploring the search space through O-contracts alone.
Appealing as the latter approach is, there are, nevertheless, problems associated with it.
The following results were established by Sandholm [13].
Fact 7. Let P0 be any initial allocation of R to A and Pt be any other allocation.
(a) The deal 〈P0,Pt 〉 can always be realised by a contract path in which every deal is an
O-contract.
(b) There are resource allocation settings, 〈A,R,U〉 within which there are IR deals
〈P0,Pt 〉 that cannot be realised by any IR C-contract path.
We note that Fact 7(b) holds even if we are concerned with settings involving only two
agents and the allocation Pt concerned is one that maximises social welfare.
In total, IR C-contracts (and thereby also the more restricted IR C(k) and IR O-
contracts) in themselves may not suffice to form an IR contract-path realising a specific
deal.
In this paper we are concerned with the following decision problem:
Definition 8. The decision problem IR-k-path (IRk) is given by
Instance: A 5-tuple 〈A,R,U,P s,P t 〉 in which 〈A,R,U〉 is a resource allocation setting,
P (s) and P (t) are allocations of R to A in which σu(P (t)) > σu(P (s)).
Question: Is there an IR C(k)-contract path that realises the deal (P s,P t )?
It is important to note that the value k (which restricts the number of resources in a
cluster contract), does not form part of an instance of IRk .
In keeping with the use of the term O-contract for C(1)-contract, we denote the decision
problem IR1 by IRO.
The main results of this article concern IRk when k is constant and IRk when the cluster
size (k) is a predefined function of the number of resources. Specifically we prove the
following:
(a) IRk is NP-hard for all constant values of k. This holds even when 〈A,R,U〉 is a set-
ting comprising two agents. The special case IRO remains NP-hard when both utility
functions are monotone.
(b) For k :N → N, satisfying k(m)  m/3, IRk(m) is NP-hard, again even in the case of
resource allocation settings involving exactly two agents.
(c) IRm/2 is NP-hard, again even in the case of resource allocation settings involving ex-
actly two agents.
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We first note that the result of Theorem 15 does not imply (from the proof presented)
either of the preceding theorems. It may seem to be the case that, when h < k, a lower
bound on the complexity of IRk implies a similar lower bound on the complexity of IRh by
virtue of the fact that within any resource allocation setting, all IR C(h)-contracts are also
IR C(k)-contracts. As we shall, however, illustrate in proving (c), it is not necessarily the
case that we can deduce IRh to be NP-hard from a proof that IRh+k is so: in order for this
to hold, the construction used in demonstrating the latter must be such that any positive
instances formed by the reduction to IRh+k admit IR C(h)-contract paths. In the case of
Theorem 14, while it is the case that our proof subsumes the result of Theorem 12, the
construction for the latter case is rather less involved and has the additional advantage that
the extension to monotone utility functions with IRO follows easily. For this reason, we
have presented separate proofs of these results.
Before proceeding, we address one issue that is raised by Fact 7. Consider the following
argument deriving from this fact.
(a) Every deal 〈P0,Pt 〉 can be realised by a sequence of O-contracts.
(b) There are IR deals which cannot be realised by a sequence of IR C-contracts.
(c) Therefore, to implement any IR deal 〈P0,Pt 〉 why not use an O-contract path some of
whose constituent deals may fail to be IR?
In other words, why might it be necessary for every deal to be IR?
One answer to this question is offered by the scenario, outlined in [4], that we now
describe. We observe that the issue underlying this argument is relevant with respect to
any class of restricted contract types, i.e., the fact that O-contracts are referred to is purely
for illustrative purposes. For simplicity, let us assume that we have a resource allocation
setting 〈A,R,U〉 involving exactly two agents {A1,A2}. These negotiate an allocation of
R working with the following protocol.
A reallocation of resources is agreed over a sequence of stages. Each stage consists
of A1 issuing a proposal to A2 of the form (buy, r,p), offering to purchase r from A2
for a payment of p; or (sell, r,p), offering to transfer r to A2 in return for a payment p.
The response from A2 is simply accept (following which the exchange is implemented)
or reject. A final allocation is fixed either when A1 is ‘satisfied’ or as soon as A2 rejects
any offer.
This is, of course, a very simple negotiation setting; however, consider its operation
when A1 wishes to bring about an allocation Pt and can thus devise a plan—a sequence of
O-contracts—to realise this from an initial allocation P0.
While A2 could be better off if Pt is realised, it may be the case that the only propos-
als A2 will accept are those under which it does not lose, i.e., A2 is not prepared to suffer
a short-term loss even if it is suggested that a long-term gain will result. Thus if some
agents are sceptical about the bona fides of others then they will be inclined to accept only
deals from which they can perceive an immediate benefit, i.e., those which are individually
rational.
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outlined: once a deal has been implemented A2 may lose utility but no further proposals are
made by A1 so that its loss is ‘permanent’. We note that even if we enrich the basic protocol
so that A1 can describe Pt to A2 before any formal exchange of resources takes place, if
〈P0,Pt 〉 is implemented by an O-contract path (via the sequence of stages outlined), A2
may still reject offers under which it suffers a loss, since it is unwilling to rely on the
subsequent O-contracts that would ameliorate its loss actually being proposed.1
Although the position taken by A2 in the setting just described may appear unduly cau-
tious, we would claim that it clearly reflects actual behaviour in certain arenas. In contexts
other than automated allocation and negotiation models in multiagent systems, there are
many examples of actions by individuals where promised long-term gains are insufficient
to engender the acceptance of short term loss, e.g., ‘chain letter’ schemes although having
a natural lifetime bounded by the size of the population in which they circulate, typically
break down before this is reached. Despite the possibility of significant gain after a tem-
porary loss, recipients may be disinclined to invest the expense requested to propagate the
chain: such behaviour is not seen as overly sceptical and cautious. In the same way, the
‘rational’ response to the widespread e-mail fraud by which one is asked to furnish bank
account details and working capital in order to facilitate the release of significant funds in
return for a percentage of these, is to ignore the request. As a final example, it is considered
standard practice to delete without reading, unexpected e-mail attachments regardless of
what incentives to open such may be promised by the accompanying message text.
In summary, the critical question underpinning such views is this: in a reallocation of
resources conducted over a sequence of stages, should either agent suffer a loss in utility
why should they have any ‘confidence’ that this loss will eventually be reversed? It is
inevitable, in view of Fact 7(b) that there will sometimes be IR deals which, if implemented
by a sequence of unrestricted O-contracts, will lead to such a loss for one agent.
In the scenario we have described, an agent A1 wishing to realise an IR deal 〈P0,Pt 〉
with an extremely cautious agent A2 faces the following dilemma: whether to formulate a
plan to realise 〈P0,Pt 〉, e.g., an O-contract path, regardless of whether this path is IR; or
whether to try and realise 〈P0,Pt 〉 by an IR O-contract path. In favour of the first option
is the fact that such a plan can always be formulated; a problem will be, however, that
the plan may never be implemented in full: A2 may reject deals under which it suffers a
loss or A1 may suffer a loss which is never put right. The second alternative—construct
an IR O-contract path—has in its favour the fact that neither agent has a rational motive
to refrain from making or accepting offers until the allocation Pt has been effected. The
drawback, however, is that it may not be possible to construct such a plan.
Nevertheless, it would seem reasonable for A1, before resorting to adopting an arbitrary
O-contract path, at least to determine if some IR O-contract path (or, more generally, some
IR C(k)-contract path) does exist. One consequence of our results is that such an approach
is unlikely to be computationally feasible.
1 We note that even if A1 attempts to construct an ordering under which any ‘irrational’ deal reduces the value
of its own holding, there is one problem: A2 may reject subsequent offers after the ‘irrational’ deals so that A1 is
worse off.
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tions raised in the final section.
3. Complexity results
Before proceeding with our results we describe our representation for typical instances
in which resource allocation settings 〈A,R,U〉 feature. The key issue here concerns the
collection of utility functions U and how these should be encoded. A form in which the
value attached to each subset of R is explicitly provided will result in an instance occu-
pying space exponential in |R| and would not be considered reasonable in practice. On
the other hand, using some encoding of U as a set of Turing machine programs, M say, it
becomes necessary to assume certain properties in interpreting their computational behav-
iour, e.g., that the value of ui(S) as returned by the program Mi is defined from the content
of Mi ’s tape after exactly some specified number of moves such as |R| since without such
it would not be possible to establish membership in NP (or, indeed, any other complexity
class).
Ideally, we wish a representation, ρ(u), of the utility function u : 2R→Q to satisfy the
following informally phrased criteria:
(a) ρ(u) is ‘concise’ in the sense that the length, e.g., number of bits, used by ρ(u) to
describe the utility function u within an instance is ‘comparable’ with the time taken
by an optimal program that computes the value of u(S).
(b) ρ(u) is ‘verifiable’, i.e., given some binary word, w, there is an efficient algorithm that
can check whether w corresponds to ρ(u) for some u.
(c) ρ(u) is ‘effective’, i.e., given S ⊆R, the value u(S) can be efficiently computed from
the description ρ(u).
It is, in fact, possible to identify a representation form that satisfies all three of these criteria:
we represent each member of U in a manner that does not require explicit enumeration
of each subset of R and allows (a) to be met; uses a ‘program’ form whose syntactic
correctness can be efficiently verified, hence satisfying (b); and for which termination in
time linear in the program length is guaranteed, so meeting the condition set by (c). The
class of programs employed are the so-called straight-line programs, which have a natural
correspondence with combinational logic networks [3].
Definition 9. An (m, s)-combinational network C is a directed acyclic graph in which there
are m input nodes, Zm, labelled 〈z1, z2, . . . , zm〉 all of which have in-degree 0. In addition,
C has s output nodes, called the result vector. These are labelled 〈ts−1, ts−2, . . . , t0〉, and
have out-degree 0. Every other node of C has in-degree at most 2 and out-degree at least 1.
Each non-input node (gate) is associated with a Boolean operation of at most two argu-
ments.2 We use |C| to denote the number of gate nodes in C. Any Boolean instantiation
2 In practice, we can restrict the Boolean operations employed to those of binary conjunction (∧), binary dis-
junction (∨) and unary negation (¬).
P.E. Dunne et al. / Artificial Intelligence 164 (2005) 23–46 31of the input nodes to α ∈ 〈0,1〉m naturally induces a Boolean value at each gate of C: if
h is a gate associated with the operation θ , and 〈g1, h〉, 〈g2, h〉 are edges of C then the
value h(α) is g1(α)θg2(α). Hence α induces some s-tuple 〈ts−1(α), . . . , t0(α)〉 ∈ 〈0,1〉s at
the result vector. For the (m, s)-combinational network C and α ∈ 〈0,1〉m, this s-tuple is
denoted by C(α).
Although often considered as a model of parallel computation, (m, s)-combinational
networks yield a simple form of sequential program—straight-line programs—as follows.
Let C be an (m, s)-combinational network to be transformed to a straight-line program,
SLP(C), that will contain exactly m + |C| lines. Since C is directed and acyclic it may be
topologically sorted, i.e., each gate, g, given a unique integer label τ(g) with 1 τ(g)
|C| so that if 〈g,h〉 is an edge of C then τ(g) < τ(h). The line li of SLP(C) evaluates the
input zi if 1  i  m and the gate for which τ(g) = i − m if i > m. The gate labelling
means that when g with inputs g1 and g2 is evaluated at lm+τ(g) since gi is either an input
node or another gate its value will have been determined at lj with j < m+ τ(g).
Definition 10. Let R be as previously with |R| = m, and u a mapping from subsets of
R to rational values, i.e., a utility function. The (m, s)-network Cu is said to realise the
utility function u if: for every S ⊆ R with αS the instantiation of Zm by zi = 1 if and only
if ri ∈ S, it holds
u(S) = val(C(αS))
m
where for β = 〈βs−1, βs−2, . . . , β0〉 ∈ 〈0,1〉s , val(β) is the whole number3 whose s-bit
binary expansion is β , i.e.,
val(β) =
s−1∑
i=0
βi ∗ 2i ,
where βi is treated as the appropriate integer value from {0,1}.
These ideas allow any utility function ui in U to be encoded using an appropriate
(m, si)-combinational network, C(i) in such a way that ui(S) can be evaluated in time
linear in the number of nodes in C(i) by determining the value of each gate under the
related instantiation αS and then dividing this value by m.
We give some concrete examples of this approach in the proof of Theorem 11. These
are primarily intended to illustrate its feasibility and, having presented these, we will not
complicate subsequent proofs with similarly detailed constructions. Regarding such con-
structions with respect to (a) of the representation criteria given, we note as a consequence
of the simulations presented in [8,15] (see, e.g., Dunne [3, pp. 28–36]), that any deter-
ministic algorithm with worst-case run-tine, T (n) can be translated into a combinational
3 Although this definition assumes utility functions to have non-negative values, were it the case that some
function with u(S) < 0 was to be represented we can achieve this by using an additional output bit, t± to flag
whether val(C(α)) should be treated as positive (t± = 0) or negative (t± = 1).
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how ui is computed, an appropriate combinational network can be built.
The decision problem IRk concerns the existence of a suitable contract path from one
allocation to another having greater social welfare. For completeness, it is useful to present
three results concerning the existence of resource allocations meeting particular criteria.
These problems are respectively,
Welfare Improvement (WI)
Instance: A tuple 〈A,R,U,P 〉 where A, R, and U are as before, and P is an allocation.
Question: Is there an allocation Q for which σu(Q) > σu(P )?
Welfare Optimisation (WO)
Instance: A tuple 〈A,R,U,K〉 where A, R, and U are as before, and K is a rational
number.
Question: Is there an allocation P for which σu(P )K?
Pareto Optimal (PO)
Instance: A tuple 〈A,R,U,P 〉 as for WI.
Question: Is the allocation P Pareto optimal?
Kraus [9, p. 43] proves NP-hardness of a weaker form of the problem WO, whereby in
addition to the total social welfare having to attain some specified value the allocation must
be such that each agent accrues some designated guaranteed utility.
Theorem 11. Even if |A| = 2 and the utility functions are monotone
(a) WI is NP-complete.
(b) WO is NP-complete.
(c) PO is CO-NP-complete.
Proof. We first demonstrate that the three problems are in the classes stated, recalling that
the utility functions U are encoded by (m, si)-combinational networks C(i) as described in
Definition 10. For (a), given an instance 〈A,R,U,P 〉 of WI simply non-deterministically
guess an allocation Q = 〈Q1, . . . ,Qn〉 and compute
σu(Q) =
n∑
i=1
val(C(i)(αQi ))
|R|
accepting if this exceeds σu(P ). For (b) a similar approach is used with an instance ac-
cepted if the guessed allocation Q has σu(Q)  K . Finally, for (c) we may use a CO-NP
algorithm to check that for all allocations Q the Pareto Optimality condition given in Def-
inition 3(1) holds.
We now prove NP-hardness for WI, WO and CO-NP-hardness for PO.
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mulae Φ(Xn) in conjunctive normal form with each clause of Φ defined by exactly three
literals. Let
Φ(Xn) =
m∧
i=1
Ci =
n∧
i=1
(yi,1 ∨ yi,2 ∨ yi,3)
be an instance of this problem, where yi,j is some literal xk or ¬xk .
Given Φ(Xn) we construct an instance 〈{A1,A2},R, 〈u1, u2〉,P 〉 in which
(a) R= {x1, x2, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn,C1, . . . ,Cm},
(b) P = 〈∅;R〉.
For W a set of literals, i.e.,
W ⊆ {x1, x2, . . . , xn,¬x1,¬x2, . . . ,¬xn}
we say that W is useful for Φ(Xn) if it satisfies both of the conditions below
(1) For each 1 k  n, W contains at most one of the literals xk , ¬xk .
(2) The partial instantiation of Xn under which each y ∈ W is assigned true, i.e.,
xi :=
{
1 if and only if xi ∈ W ,
0 if and only if ¬xi ∈ W ,
satisfies Φ(Xn). Note that if neither xi ∈ W nor ¬xi ∈ W then this partial instantiation
does not assign any value to xi .
Now with S ⊆R, let Lits(S) be the set
Lits(S) = S ∩ {x1, x2, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn}.
The utility functions 〈u1, u2〉 are now given by,
u1(S) =


0 if S = ∅,
|S|+1
2n+m if Lits(S) is useful,
|S|
2n+m if Lits(S) is not useful,
u2(S) =


2 if S =R,
1 + |S|2n+m if Lits(R \ S) is useful,
1 + |S|−12n+m if Lits(R \ S) is not useful.
Both of these are monotone. Furthermore given Φ(Xn) we may construct the com-
binational networks C(1) and C(2) as follows. Let the inputs for each network be
〈z1, . . . , z2n+m〉 with zi set to represent the presence of xi (if i  n), the presence of ¬xi−n
(if n < i  2n) and the presence of Ci−2n if (2n < i  2n+m).
For C(1) we simply use a combinational network that computes the binary representa-
tion of Useful(Z2n)+∑2n+mi=1 zi where
Useful(Z2n) =
n∧
(¬zi ∨ ¬zn+i ) ∧
m∧
(zi,1 ∨ zi,2 ∨ zi,3).i=1 i=1
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given S a subset of the literals over Xn, the term (¬zi ∨ ¬zn+i ) in the corresponding
instantiation induced over Z2n will evaluate to  if and only if at most one of the literals
{xi,¬xi} occurs in S. Similarly, for each clause Ci = (yi,1 ∨ yi,2 ∨ yi,3) defining Φ(Xn) S
contains at least one literal from Ci if and only if the term (zi,1 ∨ zi,2 ∨ zi,3) evaluates to 
for the instantiation of Z2n defined from S.
The summation to compute the binary representation of the number of bits set to 1
within Z2n+m can be carried out using the using the schema of Muller and Preparata [11],
see, e.g., [3, pp. 112–114]. The whole number val(C1(αS)) computed will be |S|, i.e., the
number of variables set to 1 in αS , if S is empty or not useful; and |S| + 1 if S is useful.
For C(2), a combinational network computes the binary representation of
2n+m−1∑
i=1
1 +
2n+m∧
i=1
zi +
2n+m∑
i=1
zi + Useful(¬z1, . . . ,¬zn,¬zn+1, . . . ,¬z2n).
For S ⊆R, this will return val(C(2)(αS)) as
4n+ 2m = 2n+m− 1 + 1 + 2n+m+ 0 when S =R,
2n+m+ |S| = 2n+m− 1 + 0 + |S| + 1 when Lits(R \ S) is useful,
2n+m+ |S| − 1 = 2n+m− 1 + 0 + |S| + 0 when Lits(R \ S) is not useful.
It is clearly the case that these descriptions can be constructed in polynomial-time from the
formula Φ(Xn).
Now, noting that σu(〈∅;R〉) = 2, we claim that there is an allocation, Q, having
σu(Q) > 2 if and only if Φ(Xn) is satisfiable. To see this consider any non-empty S ⊆R
and the allocation 〈S,R \ S〉 to 〈A1,A2〉. We have,
σu
(〈
S,R \ S〉)=
{ |S|+1
2n+m + 1 + |R\S|2n+m if Lits(S) is useful,
|S|
2n+m + 1 + |R\S|−12n+m otherwise.
In the former case we get, σu(〈S,R \ S〉) = 2 + 1/(2n + m) and, in the latter, σu(〈S,
R \ S〉) = 2 − 1/(2n+m). Thus the allocation 〈∅,R〉 is welfare improvable if and only if
there is an allocation S to A1 for which Lits(S) is useful: a condition that requires Lits(S)
to induce a satisfying instantiation of Φ(Xn), completing the proof that WI is NP-hard.
For part (b) we simply form the instance, 〈{A1,A2},R, 〈u1, u2〉,K〉 with R, 〈u1, u2〉
as in part (a) and K = 2 + 1/(2n+m).
For part (c), although continuing to employ a reduction from 3-SAT, we restrict in-
stances of this to formulae that contain exactly n clauses, a variant shown to be NP-
complete in [5, Theorem 2(b)]. We use R and 〈u1, u2〉 as previously, but set P =
〈P1,P2〉 = 〈{C1, . . . ,Cn}, {x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn}〉. In this case we have u1(P1) = 1/3
and u2(P2) = 1+ (2n−1)/(3n), so that σu(P ) = 2−1/(3n). We claim that this allocation
is Pareto optimal if and only if Φ(Xn) is unsatisfiable. First suppose Φ(Xn) is unsatisfi-
able. Certainly for any allocation Q = 〈S,R \ S〉 differing from 〈P1,P2〉, it must be the
case that S = ∅ or Lits(S) is not useful. In the former case,
u1(∅) = 0 < u1(P1) = 13
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to 〈∅,R〉.
If S is non-empty then
σu
(〈S,R \ S〉)= u1(S)+ u2(R \ S) = 2 − 13n
and so does not increase social welfare. It follows that, in this case,([
u1(S) > u1(P1)
]∨ [u2(R \ S) > u2(P2)])
⇒([
u1(S) < u1(P1)
]∨ [u2(R \ S) < u2(P2)]).
Hence if Φ(Xn) is unsatisfiable then P is Pareto optimal. On the other hand suppose
Φ(Xn) is satisfiable. We can then demonstrate that P is not Pareto optimal by consid-
ering any set of literals {y1, . . . , yn} whose instantiation to true satisfies Φ . With such a set
consider the allocation
Q = 〈Q1,Q2〉 =
〈{y1, . . . , yn}, {¬y1, . . . ,¬yn,C1, . . . ,Cn}〉.
Certainly Lits(Q1) is useful, therefore
u1(Q1) = n+ 13n > u1(P1),
u2(Q2) = 1 + 23 > u2(P2).
We deduce that the allocation P is Pareto optimal if and only if Φ(Xn) is unsatisfiable. 
We now proceed with the main results of this paper, showing that deciding if an individ-
ually rational C(k)-contract path exists between two allocations, is NP-hard for all constant
values of k and when k can be a predefined function of the size of the resource set. In all
cases the results hold in setting involving exactly two agents.
Theorem 12. For all constant, k, IRk is NP-hard.
Corollary 13. IRO is NP-hard in resource allocation settings for which all utility functions
are monotone.
Theorem 14. For k :N→N satisfying k(m)m/3, IRk(m) is NP-hard.
Theorem 15. IRm/2 is NP-hard.
We have commented earlier on the relationship between these results and our reasons
for presenting the proofs separately.
Before continuing it is noted that, in contrast to the complexity classifications for the
three problems reviewed in Theorem 11, we do not present upper bounds for any of the
cases considered: we prove NP-hardness but not NP-completeness, i.e., do not present al-
gorithms establishing membership in NP.
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an ‘obvious’ NP algorithm available, namely: guess a sequence of C(k)-contracts to re-
alise 〈P s,P t 〉 and check whether this defines an IR C(k)-contract path. This algorithm,
however, may not be implementable4 with an NP computation. For example, in the case
of O-contracts, there may be a unique IR O-contract path realising the deal 〈P s,P t 〉 but
containing exponentially many (in m) O-contracts: such paths fail to provide the polyno-
mial length certificate required for membership in NP. Constructions, in instances where
only two agents are involved, are given in [4, Theorems 3, 4], for both unrestricted and
monotone utility functions. Although not presented explicitly in [4], it is easy to extend
these to IR C(k)-contracts for any constant k. Of course the ‘obvious’ algorithm we have
outlined will be realisable in NP for resource allocation settings that satisfy certain cri-
teria. One such criterion is that the number of distinct values which σu(P ) can take is
polynomially-bounded in m: i.e., if |{w: ∃ an allocation P for which σu(P ) = w}|mp .
In such settings, no IR contract-path can contain more than mp deals. Thus, if instances of
IRk are restricted to those for which σu has this property, then the corresponding decision
problem is in NP. While this may seem to be a rather trivial example, we mention it since,
as will be clear from the constructions presented in the proofs, the resource allocation set-
tings formed have precisely this property: the number of distinct values that σu(P ) may
take is O(m). We can therefore deduce that, with such a restriction applying, the resulting
decision problem is NP-complete. The question of upper bounds on the complexity of IRk
when arbitrary resource allocation settings may form part of an instance, remains, however,
an open issue.
We now proceed with the proofs of Theorems 12 and 14.
Proof of Theorem 12. Given an instance Φ(Xn) of 3-SAT, we form an instance TΦ =
〈A,R,U,P s,P t 〉 of IRk for which there is an IR C(k)-contract path realising 〈P s,P t 〉 if
and only if Φ(Xn) is satisfiable. Without loss of generality, it may be assumed that n 2k
(recalling that k is constant). We use
A= {A1,A2},
R= {x1, x2, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn},
P s = 〈∅; {x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn}〉,
P t = 〈{x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn}; ∅〉,
u2(S) = |S|.
In order to define the utility function, u1 we need to extend our definition of a set of
literals S being useful. We say that S is an effective set of literals for Φ(Xn) if both of the
following hold.
(a) For each 1 i  n, S contains at most one of the literals xi , ¬xi .
4 Our use of ‘may not’, as opposed to the more emphatic ‘cannot’, is intended: there is a rather subtle (and,
at present, unresolved) technical complication that precludes the latter form. We discuss this issue further in
Section 4.1 below.
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by applying the partial instantiation of Xn under which each y ∈ S is assigned true5
then ΨS is satisfiable.
We note that every useful set S for Φ(Xn) is also an effective set, however, the converse
does not hold in general.
Given the definition of an effective set of literals, we now define
u1(S) =


2|S| if |S| n− k or |S| > n,
2|S| if n− k < |S| n and S is effective for Φ(Xn),
|S| if n− k < |S| n and S is not effective for Φ(Xn).
The key feature of this definition concerns how efficiently u1(S) can be represented: cer-
tainly whenever |S| n−k or |S| > n this is easy. Similarly, for |S| outside this range, it is
straightforward to determine whether S contains a literal y and its negation ¬y. This leaves
the case: n− k < |S| n where for each y, S contains at most one of the literals {y,¬y}.
For this, whether u1(S) is 2|S| or |S| depends on the induced subformula ΨS from Φ and
whether this is satisfiable. From our definition, ΨS is defined over at most k − 1 variables,
and was induced from an instance of 3-SAT. It follows therefore that ΨS is a CNF formula
on k − 1 variables each of whose distinct clauses contains between 0 and 3 literals. Since
k is constant, we can construct a suitable combinational network to recognise satisfiable
CNF of this form and with the size of this network being constant (albeit a constant value
which may be exponential in k). For example with k = 2, the unsatisfiable CNF formulae
on a single variable z are those containing an empty clause or containing both (z) and (¬z)
as clauses.
This technical detail dealt with, we can proceed with the argument that Φ(Xn) is satis-
fiable if and only if TΦ is a positive instance of IRk .
First suppose that Φ(Xn) is satisfiable and let {y1, . . . , yn} be a set of n literals the
instantiation of each to true will satisfy Φ(Xn). Consider the sequence of 2n O-contracts,
∆ = 〈δ1, δ2, . . . , δ2n〉, in which δi = 〈P (i−1),P (i)〉, P (0) = P s and P (r) is{ 〈{y1, . . . , yr};R \ {y1, . . . , yr}〉 if r  n,
〈{y1, . . . , yn,¬y1, . . . ,¬yr−n}; R \ {y1, . . . , yn,¬y1, . . . ,¬yr−n}〉 if r > n.
The O-contract path described by ∆ realises 〈P s,P t 〉. Furthermore each δi is IR:
σu(P
(i−1)) = 2(i − 1)+ (2n− i + 1) = 2n+ i − 1,
σu(P
(i)) = 2i + (2n− i) = 2n+ i,
and for each n− k + 1 i  n, the set of literals P (i)1 held by A1 is effective from the fact
that {y1, . . . , yn} induces a satisfying instantiation for Φ(Xn).
On the other hand, suppose that ∆ = 〈δ1, δ2, . . . , δr 〉 with δi = 〈P (i−1),P (i)〉, P (0) = P s
and P (r) = P t is an IR C(k)-contract path. Since at most k literals feature in any deal, in
order to progress from P (s), in which A1 holds no literals, to P (t) in which A1 holds 2n
5 I.e., ΨS is formed from the set of clauses in Φ by removing any clause C = y ∨D and replacing C = ¬y ∨D
with D when y ∈ S.
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and n − k < |P (i)1 | n. Letting d(less) denote the value |P (i−1)1 | − (n − k) and d(more) the
value n− k − |P (i)1 | so that 0 d(less) < d(more)  k for this deal δi ,
σu(P
(i−1)) = 3n− k − d(less),
σu(P
(i)) =
{
3n− k + d(more) if P (i)1 is effective,
2n if P (i)1 is not effective.
Thus if P (i)1 is not an effective set then the deal δi is not IR: δ(less)  k − 1, and so,
σu(P
(i−1))  3n − 2k + 1 > 2n. We deduce that the existence of an IR C(k)-contract
path implies that Φ(Xn) is satisfiable. 
In the special case when k = 1, i.e., the decision problem IRO, we have the result of
Corollary 13.
Proof of Corollary 13. Using the reduction from 3-SAT to IRk from the proof of Theo-
rem 12 the utility function u2 is clearly monotone but the function u1 is not. If, however,
we modify the definition of u1 to become
u1(S) =


2|S| if |S| = n,
2n if |S| = n and S is useful,
2n− 1 if |S| = n and S is not useful,
then not only does the argument of Theorem 12 continue to hold but the utility function u1
is now monotone. 
Our final result deals with the case of IR C(k(m))-contract paths. Thus the number of re-
sources that could be transferred in a single deal is not bounded by some constant value, as
in the case of O-contracts or C(k)-contracts in general, but is now limited by some function
of the total number of resources within the setting. For example, suppose k(m) = √m:
givenA= {A1,A2}, U = 〈u1, u2〉, in the resource allocation setting 〈A, {r1, r2, r3, r4},U〉,
a C(k(m))-contract can move up to two resources between agents in a single deal. In the
same setting, but with |R| = 16, C(k(m))-contracts can now transfer up to 4 resources in
a single deal.
The fact that the bound on the number of resources allowed to feature in a single deal is
no longer constant, means that the reduction employed in proving Theorem 12 cannot be
applied in general: we need to be able to specify the utility function u1 in such a way that
from a given instance of 3-SAT an appropriate polynomial-size representation of u1 can be
built. In these proofs, we used the fact that k is constant to demonstrate that testing if a set
of literals is effective for Φ(Xn) can be carried out by testing satisfiability of CNF formulae
defined on at most k − 1 variables, and thus a ‘compact’ description of u1 was possible.
Although this construction can be effected by a polynomial-time reduction provided that
k(m) = O(logm)—since u1 need recognise only polynomially many (in m) cases—the
same device, however, cannot be used for functions such as k(m) = √m since testing if
S is effective requires testing satisfiability of CNF formulae defined on
√
n variables.
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Proof of Theorem 14. We employ a reduction from 3-SAT restricted to instances in which
the number of clauses is exactly n as in the proof of Theorem 11(c). Let
Φ(Xn) =
n∧
i=1
Ci =
n∧
i=1
(yi,1 ∨ yi,2 ∨ yi,3).
We construct TΦ = 〈A,R,U,P s,P t 〉 an instance of IRn as follows.
A= {Alits,Aclse},
R= {x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn,C1, . . . ,Cn},
P s = 〈{C1, . . . ,Cn}; {x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn}〉,
P t = 〈{x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn}; {C1, . . . ,Cn}〉.
It remains to define the utility functions ulits and uclse for each agent. If we consider any
subset S ofR, then this consists of a subset of {x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn} (literals) together
with a subset of {C1, . . . ,Cn} (clauses). For a given allocation we use Ylits to denote the
subset of literals held by Alits. Similarly Yclse, Clits, Cclse will describe respectively: the
set of literals held by Aclse, of clauses held by Alits and clauses held by Aclse. The idea
underlying the construction of these is that moving literals from Aclse to Alits by C(n)-
contracts, will only be IR if at some stage those literals held by Alits define a satisfying
instantiation of Φ(Xn) (by choosing values for the variables which make the corresponding
literals true).
ulits(Ylits ∪Clits) =


0 if |Ylits| < n and Ylits is not useful for ∧Cj∈Cclse Cj ,
0 if |Ylits| = n and Ylits is not useful for Φ(Xn),
0 if |Ylits| > n and Clits = ∅,
|Ylits| otherwise,
uclse(Yclse ∪Cclse) =


0 if |Ylits| < n and Ylits is not useful
for
∧
Cj∈Cclse Cj ,
0 if |Ylits| = n and Ylits is not useful for Φ(Xn),
0 if |Ylits| > n and Clits = ∅,
|Cclse| otherwise.
We note that |R| = 3n so our bound on cluster size allows at most n elements from R to
feature in a single deal.
We claim that Φ(Xn) is satisfiable if and only if there is an IR C(n)-contract path
realising the deal 〈P s,P t 〉.
First suppose that Φ(Xn) is satisfiable and let 〈y1, . . . , yn〉 be a set of literals the instanti-
ation of each to true satisfies Φ(Xn). Consider the sequence of O-contracts, 〈δ1, . . . , δr 〉 in
which δi = 〈P (i−1),P (i)〉 and P (0) = P s , P (r) = P t , resulting from the algorithm below.
(1) i := 1; j := 1.
(2) P (j) is formed by moving the literal yi from Yclse (in P (j−1)) to Ylits.
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(3.1) Let {D1, . . . ,Dp} be the clauses currently in Clits in which yi occurs.
(3.2) The next p O-contracts move each D ∈ {D1, . . . ,Dp} from Clits to Cclse.
(3.3) j := j + p; i := i + 1;
(4) If i  n repeat from step (2).
(5) The final n O-contracts transfer each literal ¬yi from Yclse to Ylits.
To see that this procedure constructs an IR O-contract path realising 〈P s,P t 〉 it suffices to
note that in the allocation P (j),
ulits(Y
(j)
lits ∪C(j)lits ) = |Y (j)lits |,
uclse(Y
(j)
clse ∪C(j)clse) = |C(j)clse|.
Furthermore with each deal either the number of literals in Ylits increases by exactly one or
the number of clauses in Cclse increases by exactly one.
Thus, if Φ(Xn) is satisfiable then this instance TΦ of IRn is accepted.
For the converse implication, suppose ∆ is a IR C(n)-contract path realising the deal
〈P s,P t 〉: ∆ = 〈δ1, δ2, . . . , δi, . . . , δr 〉 with δi = 〈P (i−1),P (i)〉, P (0) = P s , P (r) = P t , and
P (i) = 〈Y (i)lits ∪C(i)lits, Y (i)clse ∪C(i)clse〉.
Noting that σu(P s) = 0, consider the first deal δi = 〈P (i−1),P (i)〉 in ∆ for which the
following are true: C(i−1)lits = ∅ and C(i)lits = ∅. Certainly there must be such a deal since the
first condition is true of P s while the second holds for P t . Consider the various possibili-
ties:
(a) |Y (i−1)lits | > n.
If such a case were to occur then ulits(Y (i−1)lits ∪C(i−1)lits ) = 0 and uclse(Y (i−1)clse ∪C(i−1)clse ) =
0: in P (i−1), Alits holds a non-empty set to clauses together with more than n literals.
This contradicts the assumption that ∆ is IR since it leads to σu(P (0)) = σu(P (i−1) =
0. We note that we cannot have i = 1 because of the premise |Y (i−1)lits | > n.
(b) |Y (i−1)lits | n.
Since δi is a transfer of resources from Alits to Aclse, we have Y (i)lits ⊆ Y (i−1)lits : if the set
Y
(i−1)
lits is not useful for Φ(Xn) then this would give σu(P
(i)) = σu(P s) (since both
contributing utilities would be 0). This contradicts the assumption that ∆ is IR, hence
in this case Y (i−1)lits must be useful and thus Φ is satisfiable. 
In our final result we show that the bound on cluster size may be increased to m/2.
The argument used in the proof differs in one significant aspect from those presented in
Theorem 12 and Theorem 14: it does not allow a lower bound on the complexity of IRm/2−d
(d > 0) to be deduced.
Proof of Theorem 15. We again use a reduction from 3-SAT, but without the restrictions
on the number of clauses in instances employed in Theorem 14. Given Φ(Xn) an instance
of 3-SAT, the instance TΦ of IRm/2 has,
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R= {x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn},
P s = 〈∅; {x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn}〉,
P t = 〈{x1, . . . , xn,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn}; ∅〉.
The utility functions, 〈u1, u2〉 being
u1(S) =


0 if |S| < n,
0 if |S| = n and S is not useful for Φ(Xn),
n if |S| = n and S is useful for Φ(Xn),
|S| if |S| > n,
u2(S) = 0.
Noting that |R| = 2n, we claim that Φ(Xn) is satisfiable if and only if there is an IR
C(n)-contract path realising 〈P s,P t 〉, i.e., TΦ is a positive instance of IRn.
Suppose that Φ(Xn) is satisfiable. Let {y1, y2, . . . , yn} be a set of n literals the instanti-
ation of each to true will satisfy Φ(Xn). Consider the sequence of C(n)-contracts, 〈δ1, δ2〉
below in which Y ij is the subset of R held by Aj after δi .
i Y i1 Y
i
2 u1(Y
i
1) u2(Y
i
2)
0 ∅ {y1, . . . , yn,¬y1, . . . ,¬yn} 0 0
1 {y1, . . . , yn} {¬y1, . . . ,¬yn} n 0
2 {y1, . . . , yn,¬y1, . . . ,¬yn} ∅ 2n 0
This sequence is IR and realises the deal 〈P s,P t 〉 as required.
Conversely, suppose that ∆ is a IR C(n)-contract path realising the deal 〈P s,P t 〉:
∆ = 〈δ1, δ2, . . . , δi , . . . , δr 〉 with δi = 〈P (i−1),P (i)〉, P (0) = P s , P (r) = P t . Noting that
σu(P
(0)) = 0, in order for δ1 to be IR, we must have σu(P (1)) > 0. This, however, can only
happen if |Y 11 | n, and since δ1 is a C(n)-contract, it therefore follows that |Y 11 | = n. Such
an allocation to A1, however, will only yield u1(Y 11 ) > 0 if the set Y
1
1 is useful for Φ(Xn),
i.e., if Φ(Xn) is satisfiable. 
4. Further work and development
Our results presented over Theorems 12–15 above, have been concentrated on lower
bounds on computational complexity. In total for a range of values of cluster size, the
problem of deciding whether a particular resource allocation setting admits a rational
C(k)-contract path between two specified allocations appears unlikely to admits a feasible
algorithmic solution, even if the settings of interest comprise only two agents.
In this section we briefly consider approaches and open problems directed towards more
positive results. Our review comprises two subsections, the first of which deals with a
somewhat abstruse technical point alluded to earlier; the second outlining algorithmic ap-
proaches that might be used in tackling formulations of IRO as an ‘optimisation’ problem.
Readers who are more interested in the algorithmic aspects may wish to proceed directly
to the second subsection.
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We first consider the issue raised earlier, namely whether IRk ∈ NP. The results of [4,
Theorems 3, 4], whereby positive instances of IRO in two agent settings are constructed in
which the unique witnessing IR O-contract path has length exponential in m, may appear
to disqualify the obvious ‘guess and verify’ algorithm from being realisable in NP. This
reasoning, however, does not take into account the fact that an instance of IRO contains not
only the elements 〈A,R,P s,P t 〉 but also an encoding of the collection of utility functions
U . While the constructions from [4] are exponentially long in terms of the former, it is far
from clear whether these paths are also exponential in the length of an optimal straight-
line programs for U . It is this issue that raises the principal difficulty in inferring that the
obvious algorithm cannot be realised in NP as a consequence of [4]. The concerns of [4]
are in establishing ‘extremal’ properties, thus the utility functions constructed to these ends
are highly artificial in nature: in particular, the question of optimal straight-line programs
is not addressed (since this is not relevant in the context). In total, the following question
is unresolved:
Question 1. Is there a polynomial-bound, q() with which: if T = 〈A,R,U,P s,P t 〉 is
a positive instance of IRO encoded, using the approach described above, in |T | bits, then
there is always some IR O-contract path realising 〈P s,P t 〉 whose length is at most q(|T |)?
A negative answer would indicate that the obvious algorithm could not be implemented
in NP: a result that would not rule out the possibility of IRO ∈ NP, but it would indicate that
such an upper bound requires a structure other than a witnessing contract-path to serve as
the polynomial-length certificate.
A positive answer to Question 1 is likely to be extremely hard to obtain: although we
have remarked on the ‘artificial’ nature of the utility functions in [4] these are, nonetheless,
well-defined. In consequence, a positive answer would imply that any straight-line program
realising these functions has exponential length: to date the largest lower bound proved for
a n-argument function within this model is 3n given in [1], [3, pp. 91–99].
4.2. Formulating IRO as an optimisation problem
We have considered properties of C(k)-contract paths from the perspective of deciding
if paths meeting particular criteria exist: in these terms our results indicate that feasible al-
gorithms are unlikely to be found. One possibility is to identify ‘special cases’ which admit
tractable decision processes, e.g., recent work reported in [6] considers a class of resource
allocation settings motivated from a ‘task allocation’ context: the resource set is viewed as
a set of m locations, C with di,j describing the ‘cost’ of moving between ci and cj ; the
utility that each agent assigns to any subset S of C is the total cost of a minimal spanning
tree of S. There are also a number of related problems for which possible approximation
techniques may be constructed. We consider one such problems in this section and outline
a ‘greedy’ approach for it.
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then the length of any O-contract (whether or not such is individually rational) is at least
Diff (P s,P t ) =
∑
Ai∈A
∣∣{r ∈R: r ∈ P si and r /∈ P ti }∣∣.
That is, the total number of resources in R which have to reallocated from their original
owner in P s to a new owner in P t . Recognising that it may not be possible to identify
an IR O-contract path of length Diff (P s,P t ) to realise 〈P s,P t 〉 motivates the problem of
finding an O-contract path that achieves this minimal length and has the fewest number of
irrational deals among such paths. More formally,
Definition 16. The problem Minimal Irrationality (MI) takes as an instance a resource
allocation setting 〈A,R,U〉 and allocations P s , P t of R to A. The value returned by
MI(A,R,U,P s,P t ) is
min
{
k: ∃ an O-contract path, ∆ = 〈δ1, . . . , δr 〉, of length Diff (P s,P t )
realising 〈P s,P t 〉 and on which there are at most k deals, δi,
that are not individually rational
}
.
It is, of course, an immediate consequence of Theorem 12 and Corollary 13 that the de-
cision problem form of MI (in which the upper bound on the number of permitted irrational
deals, k, occurs as part of an instance) is NP-complete: use the bound k = 0 and the reduc-
tion of Corollary 13 noting that if the deal 〈P s,P t 〉 can be realised by an IR O-contract
path of length Diff (P s,P t ) if and only if the CNF from which the instance is formed is
satisfiable.
Suppose we regard MI as a (partial) function6 whose domain comprises resource allo-
cation settings T = 〈A,R,U〉 and pairs of allocations 〈P s,P t 〉 as given in Definition 16,
and whose range is N. We may re-interpret the result of [13] given in Fact 7 as indicat-
ing: MI(T , 〈P s,P t 〉) Diff (P s,P t ), i.e., there is always some O-contract path of length
Diff (P s,P t ) available; and, there are instances for which MI(T , 〈P s,P t 〉) > 0, i.e., there
deals which cannot be realised by any IR O-contract path. In total, [13] gives
∀〈T ,P s,P t 〉: MI(T , 〈P s,P t 〉)Diff (P s,P t ),
∃〈T ,P s,P t 〉: MI(T , 〈P s,P t 〉) 1.
It is a trivial matter to obtain exact bounds improving these to
∀〈T ,P s,P t 〉: MI(T , 〈P s,P t 〉)Diff (P s,P t )− 1,
∃〈T ,P s,P t 〉: MI(T , 〈P s,P t 〉)Diff (P s,P t )− 1.
For the upper bound simply note that since σu(P t ) > σ(P s) there must be at least one
IR O-contract on any O-contract path of minimal length realising 〈P s,P t 〉. For the lower
6
‘Partial’ since it is convenient to regard its value as undefined when σu(P t ) σu(P s).
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differing from P t .
While the behaviour of MI(T , 〈P s,P t 〉) from a general perspective is of some interest,
e.g., studies of its value ‘on average’, such investigations are outside the scope of this note.
Our main interest here will be to outline a heuristic aimed at constructing O-contract paths
which attain the optimal value.
To simplify the presentation we shall assume that exactly two agents are involved, not-
ing that the development to more than two is straightforward. We present the algorithm and
then discuss the thinking underpinning it
Input: 〈{A1,A2},R, {u1, u2},P s,P t 〉
returns O-contract path of length Diff (P s,P t ) realising 〈P s,P t 〉
Q := P s ; i := 1;
while Q = P t loop
Choose p ∈ Q1 \ P t1 ∪ Q2 \ P t2 such that the allocation V formed by moving p from
A1 to A2 (if p ∈ Q1) or from A2 to A1 (if p ∈ Q2) has the following properties:
P1 σu(V ) > σu(Q).
P2 σu(V )− σu(Q) is minimal among possible choices that satisfy P1.
P3 If no choice of p ∈ Q1 \ P t1 ∪Q2 \ P t2 that satisfies P1 is possible, i.e.,∀V σu(V ) σu(Q) then choose any V for which the value σu(Q)− σu(V ) is
maximised.
δi := 〈Q,V 〉;
output δi ;
Q := V ; i := i + 1;
end loop
It is not difficult to see that the sequence, 〈δ1, . . . , δr 〉, that is output by this algorithm de-
scribes an O-contract path of length r = Diff (P s,P t ): some deal is chosen via (P1–P3);
this deal is an O-contract; and, since the choice made is in terms of the current alloca-
tion (Q) with respect to the final allocation (P t ), it follows that r = Diff (P s,P t ).
The motivation for the algorithm is the following: given that σu(P t ) > σu(P s) and that
the O-contract path to be formed must have minimal length, i.e., Diff (P s,P t ), the aim
is to implement as many ‘small increases’ in σu within a minimal length path. Of course
it may happen that a point, Q, is reached where every successor O-contract will result
in σu not being increased. Rather than attempt to minimise any loss, the algorithm does
the opposite: P3 implements the deal which maximises the loss of welfare. The idea being
that the remaining O-contracts (particularly as the subsequent increments in σu are kept
minimal) will be ‘more likely’ to be IR as a result.
We outline this approach merely to indicate that there may be reasonable approxima-
tion techniques for the class of problems which have been our principal interest. We will
not present a detailed analysis of this algorithm’s performance: such studies—both exper-
imental and analytic—of this method and several variations are the topic of continuing
work.
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We have considered a number of decision problems that naturally arise from the mul-
tiagent contract negotiation models promoted by (among others) [7,13]. In summary, if
contracts are restricted to those in which a limited number of resources can be transferred
from one agent to another and are required to be rational (in the sense of strictly improving
overall worth of an allocation), then not only is it the case that a suitable contract-path to an
optimal allocation may fail to exist (as already shown in [13]), but even deciding if a path
from a given allocation to a specified more beneficial allocation is possible, is intractable.
There are a number of directions in which the results above could be developed. The re-
quirement for individuals deals in a contract-path to be IR could be relaxed so that a limited
number of ‘irrational’ deals are permitted, provided that the allocation eventually reached
improves upon the initial allocation. Alternatively, we could consider contracts in which
deals permitting an exchange of resources between two agents are allowed—the so-called
swap or S-contracts of [13]. We conjecture, however, that even these degrees of freedom
will continue to yield decision questions that are intractable.
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